On 23 May, around 500 heavily-armed Islamist militants seized control of Marawi City, provincial capital of Lanao del Sur province, in the Muslim-majority island of Mindanao – home to 20 percent of the country’s total population. The rebels blocked access to the city and stormed several buildings, including the Marawi Police Station, Amai Pakpak Hospital, Marawi City Jail (where over 100 prisoners were freed), the Cathedral of Maria Auxiliadora and the Dansalan College campus, taking dozens of civilians hostage before setting the structures on fire. Hundreds of Philippine Army (PA) troops supported by tanks, helicopter gunships and airplanes were promptly deployed to the city, with intense gunfights lasting for days. The attack and ensuing clashes left at least 139 people dead, including 21 security personnel and 19 civilians – although more casualties were feared. The violence also forced tens of thousands of the city’s 200,000 residents to flee to Iligan, located 38km (23.6 miles) north of Marawi. In the days following the attack, PA forces managed to retake 80-90 percent of the city and liberate around 1,000 hostages, although up to twice as many remained in urban areas under militants’ control.
The militant incursion has important implications at the domestic and regional levels. First and foremost, the attack highlights the fast pace at which Islamist militancy has grown in the southern Philippines and the high degree of sophistication of their cadres. Most significantly, the attack confirms that the Islamic State (IS) is present in the region, a fact long denied by the government. The attackers were led by Isnilon Hapilon, former leader of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and chief representative of IS in the Philippines and included both ASG cadres and rebels of the Maute group. While the latter group has not yet received a formal endorsement from IS, both groups have profited for years from kidnapping of locals and foreign nationals and production and trafficking of methamphetamines.
The attack also prompted President Rodrigo Duterte to declare a two-month state of martial law across Mindanao within hours of the beginning of the attack. Duterte’s imposition of military rule has been considered excessive by opposition lawmakers and journalists who fear that militant attacks could become an excuse to extend the measure nationwide, echoing the imposition of martial law under late dictator Ferdinand Marcos from 1972 to 1981. Duterte has even suggested that he was prepared to extend such measure for as long as necessary, overriding any constitutional safeguard to this end. Nonetheless, Duterte is known to have backtracked on his bombastic announcements before.
In addition, the attack on Marawi and the declaration of martial law also risk jeopardising the Philippine government’s peace process with other Marxist and Muslim armed groups by triggering a spillover of violence across Mindanao and forcing an increasingly harsh response by PA forces. Indeed, while the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) claimed to have helped civilians evacuate Marawi, it has also not fought alongside PA troops. The MILF is engaged in a struggle for self-determination and not for the creation of an Islamic nation, although their goals and strategy may suffer from an overall deterioration of the security situation in Mindanao.
The incursion on Marawi should also be interpreted at a regional level. In days after the attack, military sources confirmed the presence of dozens of foreign fighters, particularly from Indonesia and Malaysia but also from other Middle Eastern countries, suggesting that the attack had been planned well in advance, with the strategic goal of projecting IS influence in the region. Indeed, the weakening of IS positions in Syria and Iraq under pressure from the US-led coalition and Russia has corresponded to a growing threat from returning fighters to south and southeast Asian countries. In this respect, Mindanao offers a very fertile ground for returning fighters and local militants thanks to its porous borders and thick jungle, its close proximity to militant bases in Indonesia, its endemic poverty and the rooted presence of criminal, insurgent and extremist movements. Thus, chaos, poverty and violence could turn Mindanao into the prime centre for IS activities in southeast Asia, as the focus of IS operations shifts away from Syria and Iraq.
Security operations are expected to continue across Mindanao in the near- and medium-term. Duterte appears to lack a convincing strategy to solve the problem of growing Islamic militancy other than brutal repression, putting at risk the peace building efforts of his predecessor Benigno Aquino with Marxist and ethnic rebels. In this climate of violence, new IS-affiliated groups may succeed in turning ethnic separatism in Mindanao into religious extremism, a task where other terrorist organisations such as the Jemaah Islamiyah have failed in past. This could be facilitated by Duterte’s decision to extend martial law, as it remains to be seen if either the Congress or the Supreme Court would be able to safeguard the constitution and rule of law if violence continues.